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Interbranch Removal and the Court of Federal
Claims: "Agencies in Drag"
Last summer, the D.C. Circuit upheld a statute that gives the President the
power to remove judges of the United States Tax Court.' Kathleen and Peter
Kuretski, a taxpayer couple, had challenged the constitutionality of that
provision, alleging that it granted an executive official the impermissible
interbranch power to remove officials of the judicial branch. Resolving decades
of tension about the constitutional status of these Article I courts, the D.C.
Circuit held that the Tax Court is an executive branch entity, and thus the
President may constitutionally exercise intrabranch removal power over its
judges.
But when one door closes, another opens. This Comment demonstrates
that what seems like a straightforward attempt to save the Tax Court from
constitutional peril has dangerous implications elsewhere in the federal system.
Courts should apply Kuretski with a careful eye toward these collateral effects -
in particular, Kuretski's effects on the United States Court of Federal Claims
(CFC). Unlike the Tax Court judges, judges of the CFC are removable not by
the President but rather by the judges of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. This Comment argues that under the Supreme Court's removal
jurisprudence and Kuretski's analysis, that removal provision is invalid.
In Part I, I examine the relevant historical doctrine leading up to and
including Kuretski. In Part II, I argue that Kuretski's reasoning applies to the
CFC and that, as a result, the CFC is an executive branch entity. In Part III, I
conclude that the interbranch removal of CFC judges by the Federal Circuit
violates separation-of-powers principles: it is both unconstitutional and
normatively undesirable.
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1. KURETSKI AND COMPANY
The Tax Court and the CFC are similar in many ways: both are
congressionally designated as Article I courts' with judges appointed by the
President,' confirmed by the Senate,4 and removable for cause.s But the two
courts differ in an important way: Tax Court judges are removable by the
President,6 whereas CFC judges are removable by the Federal Circuit.' The
causes for which a CFC judge can be removed are broad: "incompetency,
misconduct, neglect of duty, engaging in the practice of law, or physical or
mental disability."8 Removal of a CFC judge requires "a full specification of the
charges,"' "an opportunity to be heard,"'o and a majority vote by the judges of
the Federal Circuit."
In their challenge to the Tax Court removal provision, the taxpayers in
Kuretski relied primarily on two Supreme Court decisions, Bowsher v. Synarl2
and Freytag v. Commissioner." In Bowsher, the Court held that Congress could
not reserve itself interbranch removal power over a then-executive official, the
Comptroller General.14 Then, in Freytag, the Court upheld the Chief Judge of
the Tax Court's power to appoint special trial judges, finding that the Tax
Court exercises "a portion of the judicial power of the United States."" Taking
as premises that interbranch removal violates the separation of powers and that
the President and Tax Court reside in separate branches, the Kuretskis urged
2. I.R.C. 5 7441 (2012) (Tax Court); 28 U.S.C. 5 171(a) (2012) (CFC).
3. I.R.C. 5 7 4 4 3 (b) (Tax Court); 28 U.S.C. 5 171(a) (CFC).
4. I.R.C. § 7 4 4 3 (b) (Tax Court); 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (CFC).
s. I.R.C. 5 7 4 4 3 (f) (Tax Court); 28 U.S.C. § 176(a) (CFC).
6. I.R.C. 5 74 4 3 (f)-
7. 28 U.S.C. 5 176(a).
8. Id.; see also infra text accompanying note 65.
9. 28 U.S.C. 5 17 6(b).
io. Id.
ii. Id. 5 176(a).
12. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
13. 5o U.S. 868 (1991).
14. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732. Rather than sever the removal provision from the statute that
created the office of the Comptroller General, the Court followed the statute's fallback
provision and stripped the Comptroller General of his executive duties. Id. at 734-36.
15. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 891.
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the D.C. Circuit to find that these holdings combined to render § 7443(f) an
impermissible grant of interbranch removal power."
Not so, said Judge Srinivasan of the D.C. Circuit, in an opinion for a
unanimous panel.1 7 Judge Srinivasan saved the President's § 74 4 3 (f) removal
power by reading the Court's holding in Freytag quite narrowly, avoiding a
potential parade of horribles.'" Cabining Freytag to the Appointments Clause"
context, the D.C. Circuit determined that though the Tax Court is a "Court[]
of Law" for appointments purposes, it is nevertheless an executive branch
entity.2 o So situated, § 744 3 (f) provides for "intra-not inter-branch removal"
by the President."
It is not my endeavor to critique the reasoning or result in Kuretski.2
Rather, I take Kuretski's holding at face value and explore the grave dangers it
raises for the removal provision that governs the Court of Federal Claims.' In
their briefing, the Kuretskis held the CFC out as a constitutional exemplar and
a counterpoint to the Tax Court.2 Neither the government nor the court
responded to this argument. Indeed, none of the actors took seriously the idea
that it might be the CFC, not the Tax Court, that is subject to the kind of
interbranch removal that causes constitutional concern.
16. Brief for Appellants at 28-45, Kuretski v. Comm'r, 755 F. 3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-
1090), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2309 (2015).
17. Kuretski, 755 F.3 d at 931-32.
is. Though the Kuretskis asked only for severance of § 7443(f), Brief for Appellants, supra note
16, at 45-48, remedies as severe as dismantling the entire Tax Court were raised at oral
argument, Oral Argument at 11:4o, Kuretski, 755 F.3d 929 (No. 13-1090).
19. U.S. CONST. art. II, S 2, cl. 2 (permitting Congress to vest the power to appoint inferior
officers "in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments").
2o. Kuretski, 755 F. 3 d at 940-43.
21. Id. at 932 (emphasis added).
22. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the D.C. Circuit's decision cast a single
governmental body as a legislative court, residing in the executive branch, exercising judicial
power. Such strenuous constitutional gymnastics are worthy of further analysis.
23. A lawyer for the Kuretskis later indicated as much, suggesting that an analogous "taxpayer
in the Court of Federal Claims will raise the interbranch removal power problem." Carlton
Smith, Reflections on Kuretski's Holding that the Tax Court Is Part of the Executive Branch,
TAXPROF BLOG (June 22, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof blog/2o14/06/smith
.html [http://perma.cc/MV8X-Q4W].
24. Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 41 ("Thus, the Court of Federal Claims does not suffer
from a similar cross-branch removal problem . . . ").
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II. BRANCHING OUT
In this Part, I apply Kuretski's analysis to the Court of Federal Claims to
argue that the CFC, like the Tax Court, is an executive branch entity. The
constitutional architecture behind the CFC has long been the subject of debate
and legislation.' The present incarnation of the CFC, as an Article I trial court,
resulted from the merger of the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and the United States Court of Claims. 6 Congress expressed no
strong constitutional or normative reasons for linking the two courts. One CFC
judge has even indicated that the inclusion of the Court of Claims in the
merger was "in part a reflection of a serendipity: both courts were housed in
the same building."' Focused as it was on the simultaneous creation of the
Federal Circuit, "Congress did not give sufficient attention to constitutional
requirements in structuring the new Claims Court."" Beyond declaring the
CFC to be "established under [A]rticle I,"' Congress has given no indication
of the Court of Claims's position among the branches.
Some scholars declare all Article I courts to be executive agencies outright,30
and so too Justice Scalia would have held in Freytag." Others are more
25. Others have extensively catalogued the history of the CFC and its relationship to
constitutional structure. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty,
Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 521, 575 n.204 (2003)
(chronicling the CFC's historical shifts from Article I status to Article III status and back
again). For an in-depth legislative history of the most recent Article I iteration of the CFC,
see generally Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543 (2003).
26. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
27. Eric G. Bruggink, "Unfinished Business," 71 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 879, 879 n.2 (2003).
28. Joan E. Baker, Is the United States Claims Court Constitutional?, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 55, 55-56
(1983) (questioning the CFC's constitutionality on grounds other than removal); accord id.
at 95-97; Seamon, supra note 25, at 575.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 171 (2012). But cf Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 420 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("I doubt whether Congress can 'locate' an entity within one Branch or another
for constitutional purposes by merely saying so . . . .").
30. E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
56 U. CHI. L. REv. 443, 451 n.43 (1989) ("[S]trictly speaking, 'legislative courts' are neither
legislative nor courts; rather, they are executive agencies. Nonetheless they may function
somewhat like courts."). But cf Susan Sommer, Independent Agencies as Article One
Tribunals: Foundations of a Theory of Agency Independence, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 83, 84 (1987)
(asserting the converse theory, arguably foreclosed by Kuretski, that "[i]ndependent
agencies . . . can be considered legislative courts").
31. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 909 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) ("Such tribunals, like any other administrative board, exercise the
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circumspect, venturing only that the line between Article I courts and executive
agencies is blurry or spectral." Both these courts and agencies are created
under the Article I powers of Congress," and their functions are often
interchangeable.3 4 More poetically, Professor Kenneth Karst explained this
constitutional conundrum in haiku: "Legislative courts / Are but agencies in
drag; / Glidden is but paint."" Indeed, Article I judges come with costumes:
"They may even don robes and sit behind large desks. They may call their
decisions 'orders.' They may, in fact, mimic federal courts to a great extent."36
But despite their titles and trappings, the functions these officials serve remain
executive in nature.3 7
Even short of Justice Scalia's blanket recategorization, a functional, case-
by-case analysis likewise reveals that the Court of Federal Claims is an
executive branch agency. All cases before the CFC involve the government's
determination of which of its claims will be paid.38 "Every debtor must decide
what claims to pay. Doing so is not an exercise of judicial power, even when
executive power, not the judicial power of the United States."); id. at 915 ("In fact, however,
the Tax Court is a free-standing, self-contained entity in the Executive Branch . . . .").
32. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts
Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 264 (1990); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, and Article III, i1 HARv. L. REV 915, 948 n.195 (1988); Wilber
Griffith Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARV. L. REV. 894, 920 (1930); David A. Strauss,
Article III Courts and the Constitutional Structure, 65 IND. L.J. 307, 310 (1990); A. Michael
Froomkin, Note, In Defense ofAdministrative Agency Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787, 788 n.2, 791
n.13 (1987). But see Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L.
REV. 329, 345 (1991) ("There is a fundamental difference between agencies and Article I
courts.").
33. Kuretski v. Comm'r, 755 F-3d 929, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("[T]he Tax Court's Article I origins
do not distinguish it from the mine run of Executive Branch agencies whose officers may be
removed by the President. After all, every Executive Branch entity, from the Postal Service
to the Patent Office, is established pursuant to Article I."), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2309 (2015).
34. See Fallon, supra note 32, at 948 n.195; Katz, supra note 32, at 920; Strauss, supra note 32, at
310.
3s. Federal Jurisdiction Haiku, 32 STAN. L. REV. 229, 230 (1979) (quoting a haiku by Kenneth
Karst and alluding to Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962)). Glidden purported to
elevate judges of the former Court of Claims to Article III status. See Jackson, supra note 25,
at 575 n.204.
36. Craig A. Stern, What's a Constitution Among Friends? - Unbalancing Article III, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1043, 1063 n.81 (1998).
37. Cf City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 n-4 (2013) ("[Agencies'] activities take
'legislative' and 'judicial' forms, but they are exercises of-indeed, under our constitutional
structure they must be exercises of- the 'executive Power."' (citing U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1,
cl. 1)).
38. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1509 (2012).
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the debtor takes account of the law and applies it to the claim."
9 Judicial robes
cannot change the fact that the CFC's primary function is executive, akin to the
role of a corporate treasurer: determining which debts to pay, when, and how.
The CFC's origin story is telling on this point. Though Congress did not
pay attention to the CFC's structure,40 the Department of Justice, which
drafted the plan, certainly did. The Assistant Attorney General in charge of
devising the reorganization has stated that the Department "looked around for
models elsewhere in the federal system, and [it] rather easily came upon the
United Sstates [sic] Tax Court . . . . So the Tax Court was the model for the
Claims Court."4 ' The CFC was consciously designed to mirror structurally the
Tax Court, which, as Kuretski held, is an executive branch entity.
III. JUDGES JUDGING JUDGES
Not all interbranch removal provisions are invalid, as the Supreme Court
made clear in Mistretta.' But the Supreme Court has consistently identified
several classes of cases where "the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of the other" must be curtailed. The CFC removal
provision performs two reciprocal incursions." By granting removal powers
over executive officers to Article III judges, it strips the President of his
constitutionally mandated power to remove executive officers. The removal
provision also jeopardizes the integrity of the judicial branch by aggrandizing
its power and by entangling it in supervision of the execution of the laws, an
area outside the judiciary's expertise and core function.4 s In this Part, I argue
39. Craig A. Stern, Article III and Expanding the Power of the United States Court of Federal Claims,
71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 818, 819 (2003); accord id. at 822 ("Functionally and analytically, [the
CFC] acts for the executive branch. . . . [I]t decides for the government what claims it
should pay.").
40. See sources cited supra note 28.
41. Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the "Claims Court," 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 599, 599 (2003).
42. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 n.35 (1989) ("Nothing in Bowsher, however,
suggests that one Branch may never exercise removal power, however limited, over
members of another Branch.").
43. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam).
44. Cf Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 500 (2010)
("[O]ne branch's handicap is another's strength.").
45. This is also arguably an aggrandizement of congressional power at the President's expense.
See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("If the President's authority is
diminished . . . Congress' political power must necessarily increase vis-a-vis the
President."), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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that these separation-of-powers violations are both unconstitutional and
normatively objectionable.
A. Encroachment on the Executive
As regards the executive branch, the encroachment inquiry is said to
"focus[] on the extent to which [the act in question] prevents the Executive
Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."46
Supervision and removal of executive officials are the quintessential examples
of these constitutionally assigned functions.' Since the early days of removal
jurisprudence, courts have recognized that the President's power to remove
executive officers is exclusive.48 This power can be limited to cases where good
cause is shown, 4  but those limitations cannot be so broad as to swallow the
power itself.
In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court struck down a provision insulating
members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) from
presidential removal."o Members of the PCAOB were removable only for cause
by members of the Securities and Exchange Commission, who themselves were
subject to for-cause removal by the President.s' The Court explained that this
dual for-cause standard impermissibly vested removal power not in the
President but in "other tenured officers - the Commissioners - none of whom
is subject to the President's direct control"s2 and worked a "diffusion of
accountability."" "By granting the Board executive power without the
Executive's oversight," the Court concluded, "this Act subverts the President's
ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed -as well as the public's
ability to pass judgment on his efforts. The Act's restrictions are incompatible
46. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
47. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986).
48. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 1o6, 176 (1926). Myers's fortification of
presidential powers came in an opinion written by former President and then-Chief Justice
William Howard Taft in a case on appeal, coincidentally, from the Court of Claims. See
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 64-66 (1995). Though Myers explicitly avoided the
question of whether its rule applies to Article I judges, 272 U.S. at 157-58, one dissent
insisted that it was a "mere smoke screen" to say the Court's holding would not apply with
full force, id. at 182 n.* (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
49. E.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628-29 (1935).
50. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 514 (2010).
51. Id. at 3148-49 (citing 15 U.S.C. 5§ 7211(e)(6), 7 21 7 (d)( 3 ) (2012)).
52. Id. at 3153.
s3. Id. at 31S5.
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with the Constitution's separation of powers."" Under Kuretski, CFC judges
are executive officials," and § 176 unquestionably vests removal power over
these executive officials in tenured officers not subject to the President's control
(the judges of the Federal Circuit). Indeed, this structure -transferring power
to another branch entirely-is more clearly in violation of the separation of
powers than the one at issue in Free Enterprise Fund, where a chain of removal,
though attenuated, still connected the President to the PCAOB.
Once the Court identifies encroachment, it then considers "whether that
impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the
constitutional authority of Congress.", 6 But as discussed above, Congress
offered no conceivable, much less overriding, need to justify the Federal
Circuit's removal powers." Though perhaps geographically or procedurally
expeditious, the encroaching CFC removal provision cannot be saved simply by
being "efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government."ss
Indeed, we should question whether the provision enhances the efficient
work of the government at all. The removal provision is not just formally
unconstitutional; it also frustrates political accountability, disrupts political
control over the execution of the laws, and compromises the CFC's ability to
provide a neutral forum. As Chief Justice Roberts noted in Free Enterprise Fund,
inventive removal provisions can impede political accountability." In a recent
dissent, he expanded on this line of thought, explaining that "liberty and
accountability" are values underlying the separation of powers.
In the course of performing their executive functions, CFC judges are
constrained by an improper set of incentives as they find themselves subject to
review and removal by the same court." Professor Judith Resnik suggests, by
54. Id.
ss. See supra Part II.
56. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
57. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
58. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 499 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986)).
sg. Id. at 3155.
6o. Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1955 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
61. Cf Note, Article III Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal Magistrates: A
Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023, 1056 & n.184 (1979) (citing Irving R. Kaufman, Chief
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Benjamin Cardozo Lecture at the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York: Chilling Judicial Independence (Nov. 1,
1978), in IRVING R. KAUFMAN, CHILLING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 9, 38 (1979)) (raising
these concerns in the context of federal magistrates). Magistrate and bankruptcy judges are
similarly situated in some regards but, as adjuncts within the judicial branch, do not raise
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reference to studies of European career judiciaries, that judges subject to review
and removal by the same court could have "incentives to conform and defer",62
and "to search for supporters, publish little, and keep low profiles." 63 in other
tribunals throughout the executive branch, administrative law judges are
protected by a bifurcation of these powers: removal actions are conducted by
the Merit Systems Protection Board,64 independently of any agency or judicial
review of a judge's substantive decisions. For CFC judges, there are no such
assurances. On the contrary, the CFC removal provision is, like the one at issue
in Bowsher, "very broad and ... could sustain removal ... for any number of
actual or perceived transgressions." 6s
Even unutilized formal removal power should nonetheless be concerning
given the potential for informal pressures. The late Chief Judge of the Second
Circuit, Irving Kaufman, once praised the ability of federal judges to police
other judges informally as an alternative to formal removal, citing examples of
judges forcing such informal ousters.66 But what Kaufman saw as a benefit of
judicial peer pressure can be refrained here as inadvisable interbranch
intrusion. "Few judges," he explained, "would long withstand the united
importunings of their peers. . . . Peer pressure is a potent tool." 67 Kaufman
hints at the power appellate judges have over trial judges housed in the same
building,68 highly reminiscent of the CFC and its officemate, the Federal
Circuit. Wielding these tools - peer pressure, statutory removal authority, and
appellate review-the Federal Circuit's opportunity for improper influence
impinges upon the President's control of executive officials and functions.6 9
Kaufman and I agree on at least one point: these informal maneuverings
are "neither exposed to public view nor enshrined in law."'o No matter which
branch is charged with the task of removal, there is always the risk that the
the interbranch concerns present for the CFC. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. SO, 79 & n.30 (1982) (plurality opinion) (citing United States v. Raddatz,
447 U.S. 667, 685 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
62. Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice": Inventing the Federal District Courts of the
Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 673 (2002).
63. Id. at 677.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012).
65. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986).
66. Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 708-o9 (1979).
67. Id. at 709.
68. See id. at 711.
6g. I do not mean to suggest for a moment that improper behavior has in fact occurred. Rather,
as Chief Justice Burger explained in Bowsher, the structural threat of such influence is
sufficient to raise a constitutional objection. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 730.
70. Kaufman, supra note 66, at 709.
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threat of for-cause removal - even the threat of an accusation - can result in "in
terrorem 'voluntary' resignations [that] function as removals-in-fact but
without the attendant transparency and political accountability."" Political
accountability is stretched thinnest when this power is assigned to life-tenured
judges, like the judges of the Federal Circuit here, rather than to executive
officials subject to reelection, like the President in Kuretski. Even if the removal
provision is never exercised, it obscures accountability, takes executive
functions out of the President's chain of command, and renders the CFC
structurally "subservient"' to the Federal Circuit.
B. Aggrandizement of the Judiciary
The Court's separation-of-powers jurisprudence is acutely concerned with
the effects of challenged legislation on the constitutionally limited scope of the
judicial power. In Mistretta, the Court rejected several challenges to the
constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Commission, sustaining the
President's power to remove the Commission's three Article III judges.' In
doing so, the Court described the dangers, absent in Mistretta but very much
present for the CFC, that amount to a violation of the separation of powers. In
addition to denouncing "aggrandizement or encroachment" between the
branches,' the Court requires that the judicial branch "neither be assigned nor
allowed 'tasks that are more properly accomplished by [other] branches'"" and
"that no provision of law 'impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of
the Judicial Branch.', 6 In the case of the Court of Federal Claims, I argue that
these dangers reach historically unprecedented levels.
The Court took pains to minimize judicial aggrandizement in Morrison by
sharply limiting one of the provisions at issue there, which permitted a Special
Division comprising three court of appeals judges to terminate an independent
counsel.' The D.C. Circuit below had read that termination provision broadly,
warning that it "implicated [the judiciary] directly in Executive Branch policy
judgments" and "undermine[d] the status of the judiciary as a neutral
71. Tuan Samahon, Blackmun (and Scalia) at the Bat: The Court's Separation-of-Powers Strike Out
in Freytag, 12 NEV. L.J. 691, 698 (2012).
72. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 730.
73. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 408-11 (1989).
74. Id. at 382.
75. Id. at 383 (alteration in original) (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 680-81 (1988)).
76. Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)).
77. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 682 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 5 9 6(b)(2) (Supp. V 1987)).
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forum."'8 By invoking the canon of constitutional avoidance, the Supreme
Court's reversal implicitly confirmed those fears and instead narrowly
construed the statute "in order to save it from constitutional infirmities."` 9
Thus, the Morrison Court avoided the issue squarely presented by the CFC's
removal provision, in which Article III judges are directly involved in the
supervision and termination of executive officials.
Mistretta warns against the danger of this mismatch between the province
of the courts and the tasks assigned to them. For example, the Court in
Mistretta found the appointment of Article III judges to the Sentencing
Commission constitutional only because sentencing is "clearly attendant to a
central element of the historically acknowledged mission of the Judicial
Branch."so But there is no comparable alignment of mission when Federal
Circuit judges are given removal power over the executive officials of the CFC.
As observed by the D.C. Circuit in the case that would become Morrison,
"when an Article III court is called upon to supervise and administer the
executive office, constitutional bounds are transgressed." 8 ' The power to
remove presupposes the "administrative" task of "monitor[ing]" the executive
official in advance of removal8'- a task outside the "historically acknowledged
mission" of judges.8' Article III judges are simply not in the business of
regularly overseeing officers charged with the execution of the laws. Moreover,
judges' powers and expertise are ill-suited to such sua sponte investigations,
and the Constitution insists that this power be retained by the President.8
Finally, Mistretta warns of intrusion upon the integrity and independence
of the judicial branch. In Morrison, the D.C. Circuit judges wielding
termination power over the independent counsel were statutorily barred from
reviewing any related cases. That partitioning of powers was central to saving
78. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988).
79. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 682; see also id. at 683 ("So construed, the Special Division's power to
terminate does not pose a sufficient threat of judicial intrusion into matters that are more
properly within the Executive's authority . . . ." (emphasis added)).
8o. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391; see also Lewis J. Liman, Note, The Constitutional Infirmities ofthe
United States Sentencing Commission, 96 YALE L.J. 1363, 1377-78, 1380-81 (1987).
81. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 512.
82. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 682.
83. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391.
84. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5 (providing that the President "shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed"), with id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (establishing the scope of the judicial
power).
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the statute from constitutional challenge.8' But in the case of the CFC, the very
same Federal Circuit judges are tasked with removal of the executive officials
whose actions they review. As the Supreme Court warned, such a regime
threatens a "taint of the independence of the Judiciary such as would render the
Act invalid under Article III.",86
Litigants also suffer when this integrity is jeopardized. Acknowledging the
difficulty litigants face in such situations, the D.C. Circuit warned of the
"subtle calculations" that must be made when the reviewing judge and the
terminating judges are peers from the same circuit court.8' For litigants
appealing CFC decisions to the Federal Circuit, that distinction between peers
is collapsed-reviewer is remover-and the calculations are compounded.8"
Consider also a possible constitutional challenge to the removal provision,
§ 176. The only conceivable route for such a challenge would be on appeal from
the CFC to the Federal Circuit, where the circuit judges would then be faced
with assessing their own possibly conflicting interests and powers. For CFC
litigants seeking to challenge the statute, no truly neutral Article III venue is
available save a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
In the narrow context of the Tax Court, Kuretski works a compromise by
reimagining constitutional doctrine to preserve the status quo. But the D.C.
Circuit's novel constitutional holding is not so easily cabined. When we
reenvision Article I courts as executive branch entities, as Judge Srinivasan did
in Kuretski, a new question of constitutional powers arises like whack-a-mole.
Less than two miles away from the Tax Court sit the CFC judges, executive
officials subject to interbranch removal by the judiciary.
Under Kuretski, this constitutional infirmity must be cured by invalidating
5 176. Congress could then respond with an amendment vesting that removal
power in the President rather than Article III judges. The judges of the Court
of Federal Claims can serve their terms subject to presidential removal, but
85. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 683-84 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 4 9 (f) (Supp. V 1987)); cf Edmond v.
United States, 520 U.S. 651, 664 (1997) (emphasizing the partitioning of powers -review
and removal - over the military courts of criminal appeals and the judges thereof).
86. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 684.
87. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd sub non. Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988).
88. Elizabeth I. Winston, Differentiating the Federal Circuit, 76 Mo. L. REv. 813, 835 (2011) ("Fear
of removal, however unjustified, impacts that separation [between trial and appellate
tribunals] to the detriment of litigants.").
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they constitutionally cannot and normatively should not remain subject to
interbranch removal by the federal judiciary.
JAMES ANGLIN FLYNN
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